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Abstract
In this paper we develop conditions for various types of stability in social
networks governed by Imitation of Success principle. Considering so-called
Prisoner’s Dilemma as the base of node-to-node game in the network we ob-
tain well-known Hopfield neural network model. Asymptotic behavior of the
original model and dynamic Hopfield model have a certain correspondence.
To obtain more general results, we consider Hopfield model dynamic system
on time scales. Developed stability conditions combine main parameters of
network structure such as network size and maximum relative nodes’ degree
with the main characteristics of time scale, nodes’ inertia and resistance, rate
of input-output response.
Keywords: time scale, stability, asymptotical stability, Hopfield neural
network, social network, Prisoner’s Dilemma
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1. Introduction
A social network is the set of people or groups of people with some pattern
of links or interconnection between them. Processes taking place on social
networks often may be interpreted as information transition.
The aim of this paper is to consider asymptotic properties of collective
opinion formation in social networks with general topology. Transition of
opinion between linked nodes will be modelled by game-theoretical mecha-
nism. Total payoff may be a key factor to choose one of the two alternative
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strategies, cooperation or defection in opinion propagation. Such type of
dynamics is called Imitation of Success. An opposite (in some sense) kind
of model is for example the Voter Model. Last named model assume imi-
tation of a behavior of uniformly random chosen neighbor node and games
payoff has no affects on state updating of the particular node. In paper
Manshadi and Saberi (2011) was considered model called Weak Imitation of
Success. This updating rule is mixture of IS and VM rules: dependently of
some parameter ε behavior of updating node may be close to one of the two
types of dynamics.
The analysis of the total payoff function for so-called Prisoner’s Dilemma
leads us to well-known Hopfield neural network model Hopfield (1984). Asymp-
totic behavior of the direct node-to-node model and dynamic Hopfield model
have a certain correspondence. To obtain more general results, we con-
sider Hopfield model on time scale. This problem is discussed in detail in
Martynyuk (2012), but we develop more direct and precise conditions for
stability of the social network behavior.
2. Preliminary results.
We now present some basic information about time scales according to
Bohner and Peterson (2012). A time scale is defined as a nonempty closed
subset of the set of real numbers and denoted by T. The properties of the
time scale are determined by the following three functions:
(i) the forward-jump operator: σ(t) = inf {s ∈ T : s > t};
(ii) the backward-jump operator: ρ(t) = sup {s ∈ T : s < t} (in this case,
we set inf∅ = supT and sup∅ = inf T);
(iii) the granularity function µ(t) = σ(t)− t.
The behavior of the forward- and backward-jump operators at a given
point of the time scale specifies the type of this point. The corresponding
classification of points of the time scale is presented in Table 1.
We define a set Tκ in the following way:
T
κ =
{
T \ {M} , if ∃ right scattered point M ∈ T :M = supT, supT <∞
T, otherwise.
In what follows, we set [a, b] = {t ∈ T : a 6 t 6 b}.
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Table 1: Classification of time scale’s points
t right-scattered t < σ(t)
t right-dense t = σ(t)
t left-scattered ρ(t) < t
t left-dense ρ(t) = t
t isolated ρ(t) < t < σ(t)
t dense ρ(t) = t = σ(t)
Definition 1. Let f : T → R and t ∈ Tκ. The number f∆(t) is called
∆-derivative of function f at the point t, if ∀ε > 0 there exists a neighborhood
U of the point t (i. e., U = (t− δ, t + δ) ∩ T, δ < 0) such that
|f(σ(t))− f(s)− f∆(t)(σ(t)− s)| 6 ε|σ(t)− s| ∀s ∈ U.
Definition 2. If f∆(t) exists ∀t ∈ Tκ, then f : T → R is called ∆-
differentiable on Tκ. The function f∆(t) : Tκ → R is called the delta-
derivative of a function f on Tκ.
If f is differentiable with respect to t then f(σ(t)) = f(t) + µ(t)f∆(t).
Definition 3. The function f : T → R is called regular if it has finite
right limits at all right-dense points of the time scale T and finite left limits
at all points left-dense points of T.
Definition 4. The function f : T → R is called rd-continuous if it is
continuous at the right-dense points and has finite left limits at the left-dense
points. The set of these functions is denoted by Crd = Crd(T) = Crd(T;R).
The indefinite integral on the time scale takes the form∫
f(t)∆t = F (t) + C,
where C is integration constant and F (t) is the preprimitive for f(t). If the
relation F∆(t) = f(t) where f : T→ R is an rd-continuous function, is true
for all t ∈ Tκ then F (t) is called the primitive of the function f(t). If t0 ∈ T
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then F (t) =
t∫
t0
f(s)∆s for all t. For all r, s ∈ T the definite ∆-integral is
defined as follows:
s∫
r
f(t)∆t = F (s)− F (r).
Definition 5. For any regular function f(t) there exists a function F dif-
ferentiable in the domain D and such that the equality F∆(t) = f(t) holds for
all t ∈ D. This function is defined ambiguously. It is called the preprimitive
of f(t).
Definition 6. A function p : T→ R is called regressive (positive regres-
sive) if
1 + µ(t)p(t) 6= 0, (1 + µ(t)p(t) > 0), t ∈ Tκ.
The set of regressive (positive regressive) and rd-continuous functions is de-
noted by R = R(T) (R+ = R+(T)).
Definition 7. For any p, q ∈ R by definition put
(p⊕ q)(t) = p(t) + q(t) + p(t)q(t)µ(t), t ∈ Tκ.
It is easy to see that the pair (R,⊕) is an Abelian group. As shown in
[Bohner Peterson], a function p from the class R can be associated with a
function ep(t, t0) which is the unique solution of Cauchy problem
y∆ = p(t)y, y(t0) = 1.
The function ep(t, t0) is an analog, by its properties, of the exponential func-
tion defined on R.
Let us consider dynamic system on time scale T:{
x∆ = f(t, x)
x(t0) = x0.
(1)
In following formulations we denote solution of (1) by x(t; t0, x0).
Definition 8. The equilibrium state x = x∗ of the system (1) is uniformly
stable if ∀ε > 0 there exists δ = δ(ε), such that
‖x0 − x∗‖ < δ =⇒ ‖x(t; t0, x0)− x∗‖ < ε, ∀t ∈ [t0,+∞]T, t0 ∈ T.
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Definition 9. The equilibrium state x = x∗ of the system (1) is uniformly
asymptotically stable if it is uniformly stable and there exists ∆ > 0 such that
‖x0 − x∗‖ < ∆ =⇒ lim
t→+∞
‖x(t; t0, x0)− x∗‖ = 0, ∀t0 ∈ T.
Definition 10. The equilibrium state x = x∗ of the system (1) is uni-
formly exponentially stable if there exist constants α, β > 0 (β ∈ R+) such
that
‖x(t, t0, x0)‖ 6 ‖x(t0)‖αe−β(t, t0), t > t0 ∈ T,
for all t0 ∈ T and x(t0) ∈ Rn.
In further definitions and theorems 1 – 3 we assume f(t, 0) = 0 for all
t ∈ T, t > t0 and x0 = 0 so that x = 0 is a solution to equation (1). For more
details see Hoffacker and Tisdell (2005).
Definition 11. A function ψ : [0, r] → [0,∞) is of class K if it is well-
defined, continuous, and strictly increasing on [0, r] with ψ(0) = 0.
Definition 12. A continuous function P : Rn → R with P (0) = 0 is
called positive definite (negative definite) on D if there exists a function ψ ∈
K, such that ψ (‖x‖) 6 P (x) (ψ (‖x‖) 6 −P (x)) for x ∈ D.
Definition 13. A continuous function P : Rn → R with P (0) = 0 is
called positive semidefinite (negative semidefinite) on D if P (x) > 0 (P (x) 6
0) for x ∈ D.
Definition 14. A continuous function Q : [t0,∞)×Rn → R with Q(t, 0) =
0 is called positive definite (negative definite) on [t0,∞)×D if there exists a
function ψ ∈ K, such that ψ (‖x‖) 6 Q(t, x) (ψ (‖x‖) 6 −Q(t, x)) for t ∈ T,
t > t0, x ∈ D.
Definition 15. A continuous function Q : [t0,∞)×Rn → R with Q(t, 0) =
0 is called positive semidefinite (negative semidefinite) on [t0,∞) × D if
Q(t, x) > 0 (Q(t, x) 6 0) for t ∈ T, t > t0, x ∈ D.
In what follows by V ∆(t, x) we denote the full ∆-derivative for function
V (x(t)) along solution of (1).
Theorem 1. If there exists a continuously differentiable positive-definite
function V in a neighborhood of zero with V ∆(t, x) negative semidefinite, then
the equilibrium solution x = 0 of equation (1) is stable.
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Theorem 2. If there exists a continuously differentiable, positive definite
function V in a neighborhood of zero and there exists a ξ ∈ Crd ([t0,∞) ; [0,∞))
and a ψ ∈ K, such that
V ∆(t, x) 6 −ξ(t)ψ (‖x‖) ,
where
lim
t→∞
t∫
t0
ξ(s)∆s =∞, (2)
then the equilibrium solution x = 0 to equation (1) is asymptotically stable.
Theorem 3. If there exists a continuously differentiable, positive definite
function V in a neighborhood of zero and there exists a ξ ∈ Crd ([t0,∞) ; [0,∞))
and a ψ ∈ K, such that
V ∆(t, x) 6 ξ(t)ψ (‖x‖) ,
where (2) holds, then the equilibrium solution x = 0 to equation (1) is un-
stable.
Here and elsewhere we shall use spectral matrix norm as a norm by de-
fault:
‖A‖
2
=
√
λmax (A
∗
A).
Now we formulate a base model for Hopfield network dynamics and few
important results about stability of its solutions. Indeed, let us consider
dynamic equation of the type
x∆(t) = −Bx(t) + Ag(x(t)) + J, (3)
where t ∈ T, supT = +∞, x(t) ∈ Rn, A = (aij), i, j = 1, n, B = diag (bi),
bi > 0, i = 1, n, J = (J1, . . . , Jn)
T , g(x) = (g1(x1), . . . , gn(xn))
T . Also,
b¯ = max
i
{bi}, b = min
i
{bi}. Conceptual meaning of model’s components will
be clarified below.
We assume on system (3) as follows.
S1. The vector-function f(x) = −Bx+ Ag(x) + J is regressive.
S2. There exist positive constants Mi > 0, i = 1, n, such that |gi(x)| 6 Mi
for all x ∈ R.
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S3. There exist positive constants λi > 0, i = 1, n such that |gi(x′)− gi(x′′)| 6
λi |x′ − x′′| for all x′, x′′ ∈ R. In what follows we denote Λ = diag (λi),
L = max
i
λi.
Definition 16. An n×n matrix A that can be expressed in the form A =
sE − B, where E is an identity matrix, B = (bij) with bij > 0, 1 6 i, j 6 n,
and s > ρ(B), the maximum of the moduli of the eigenvalues of B, is called
an M-matrix.
It should be noted that M-matrix can be characterized in many other
ways. Detailed description of forty such ways one can find in Plemmons
(1977). For our purpose we find useful the following definition.
Definition 17. An n× n matrix A with non-negative diagonal elements
and non-positive off-diagonal ones is called M-matrix when real part of each
eigenvalue of A is positive.
Lemma 1. (Martynyuk, 2012, lemma 5.1.2) Let assumption S3 be ful-
filled. If for every fixed t ∈ T the matrix (I − µ(t)B) Λ−1 − µ(t) |A| is an
M-matrix, the function f(x) = −Bx+ Ag(x) + J is regressive.
Lemma 2. (Martynyuk, 2012, lemma 5.1.1) If for system (3) conditions
S1 − S3 are satisfied then there exists an equilibrium state x = x∗ of system
(1) and moreover, ‖x∗‖ 6 r0, where
r0 =

 n∑
i=1
1
b2i
(
n∑
j=1
Mj |aij|+ |Ji|
)2
1
2
.
Besides, if the matrix BΛ−1 − |A| is an M-matrix, this equilibrium state is
unique.
And last result we need is so-called Gershgorin circle theorem. Let A be
a complex n × n matrix, with entries aij. For i ∈ {1, . . . , n} let ρi be the
sum of the absolute values of the non-diagonal entries in the i-th row. Let
D(aii, ρi) be the closed disc centered at aii with radius ρi. Such a disc is
called a Gershgorin disc.
Theorem 4 (Gershgorin circle theorem). Every eigenvalue ν of A lies
within at least one of the Gershgorin discs D(aii, ρi), i. e. there exists i ∈
{1, . . . , n} such that
|ν − aii| 6 ρi =
∑
j 6=i
|aij | .
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3. Main results
3.1. Node-to-node game setup.
Let us define a set of nodes V = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Each member of V is
interpreted as player in some matrix game with its neighbors. This game
repeats at time steps, discrete or continuous. Set of i-th node neighbors we
denote by Ωi, ki = |Ωi|. Here we consider only one type of matrix game is
known as Prisoner’s Dilemma. Each node has two strategies: cooperate (C)
and defect (D). Payoff matrix is illustrated below:
P =
(
b− c b
−c 0
)
.
Here b is a benefit provided by node to its co-player, c is a cost of cooperation
and hereafter we assume b > c. In this case the strategy of mutual defection
is the only Nash equilibrium, while mutual cooperation is more acceptable
social outcome.
Current state of i-th node at moment t we denote by Si(t) ∈ {0, 1}, where
zero state represent the defection strategy. Easy to show that at the instant of
time t node i gets total payoff equal to −kicSi(t)+
∑
j∈Ωi
bSj(t). This equation
remains correct regardless of the nature of time. Hence in what follows we
assume t ∈ T, where T is time scale.
3.2. Hopfield network setup.
Assume reaction of each node in network is governed by simple threshold
rule:
Si(t) =


0, if − kicSi(t) +
∑
j∈Ωi
bSj(t) < Ui,
1, if − kicSi(t) +
∑
j∈Ωi
bSj(t) > Ui,
where Ui is individually payoff threshold for cooperation. With the aim of
using Hopfield neurons model we transform last threshold rule to the rule
with continuous responses. In the end this transformation will lead us to
dynamical system on time scale modelling asymptotic behavior of network.
Let the state variable Si for i-th “neuron” have the range [0, 1] and be a
continuous and strictly increasing function of the total payoff ui. In biological
terms Si and ui are output and input signal of i-th “neuron” respectively.
Input–output relation we denote by gi(ui), so Si(t) = gi(ui(t)) and ui(t) =
8
g−1(Si(t)). If some node having non-zero payoff abruptly loses all connections
in the network, its behavior may be described by simple dynamic equation:
Ciu
∆
i (t) = −
ui(t)
Ri
,
ui(0) = ui0.
By analogy with electrical circuit theory in last equation Ci is called ca-
pacitance of i-th node and Ri is called its resistance. Obviously, without
communication node’s payoff will decay to zero as individual intention of
cooperation do.
With communication the node gets additional payoff playing with its
neighbours, so dynamic equation becomes as follows:
Ciu
∆
i (t) = −ckiSi(t) +
∑
j∈Ωi
bSj(t)− ui(t)
Ri
, i = 1, n,
or, using input–output relation and adjacency matrix of networkD = (dij) , i, j =
1, n,
Ciu
∆
i (t) = −ckigi(ui) +
∑
j
bdijgj(uj)− ui
Ri
, i = 1, n.
Let us introduce two matrices:
A =


−k1c
C1
bd12
C1
. . .
bd1n
C1
bd21
C2
−k2c
C2
. . .
bd2n
C2
. . . . . . . . . . . .
bdn1
Cn
bdn2
Cn
. . . −knc
Cn


, B =


1
R1C1
0 . . . 0
0
1
R2C2
0 . . .
. . .
0 0 . . .
1
RnCn


.
Then we can rewrite equation in vector form:
u∆(t) = −Bu(t) + Ag(u(t)). (4)
It is easy to see that without significant changes in arguments we can
consider more general model with constant input for every node in network.
By denoting this input as vector J = (Ji), we finally get our main equation
as follows:
u∆(t) = −Bu(t) + Ag(u(t)) + J. (5)
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3.3. Stability condition for network game
Theorem 5. For system (5) assume that conditions S1 − S3 are valid
and
ki <
λi
Ri (c+ b)
, i = 1, n.
Then there exists unique equilibrium state u = u∗ of system (5) and ‖u∗‖ 6
r0.
Proof. Let us show Q = BΛ−1 − |A| be an M-matrix. Using inequality for
number of neighbors it is easy to derive estimation for real part of eigenvalues
ν of matrix Q. Indeed, by Gershgorin circle theorem Re ν > 0 if and only if
Qii − ρi > 0 for all i = 1, n , where
Qii =
λi
RiCi
− kic
Ci
,
ρi =
∑
j 6=i
|Qij | = b
Ci
∑
j 6=i
dij =
kib
Ci
.
We can write
Qii − ρi = λi
RiCi
− kic
Ci
− kib
Ci
=
λi
RiCi
− ki c+ b
Ci
> 0
and it is obvious that the upper bound for ki in theorem’s statement does
guarantee last inequality. Hence Q is anM-matrix and now to end the proof
it remains to apply lemma 2. 
Remark 1. It is interesting to notice that existence of unique stable state
in network does not depend on nodes’ “capacitance”.
Remark 2. For every particular node in network ratio λi
Ri
describes its
potential activity. If λi > kiRi then node’s output reaction can conquer with
its overall “resistance” to accept neighbor’s behaviour.
Remark 3. Notice that in theorem key role plays overall payoff scale of
the game expressed as sum b+ c.
It is particularly remarkable that existence of the unique equilibrium state
in network is robust against vanishing of any particular node. Indeed, nodes
fulfil conditions of theorem 5 independently. So if there exists the unique
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equilibrium state, vanishing any particular node does not affect on the con-
ditions for all other nodes. On the other hand, a new node may easily violate
conditions of theorem and break the existence of equilibrium.
In two theorems below we use Lyapunov method to formulate sufficient
conditions for asymptotic stability of stable state in network dynamics. Let
u = u∗ be the unique stable state of (5), i. e.
−Bu∗ + Ag(u∗) + J = 0.
By introducing new variable z = u−u∗ we obtain dynamical system on time
scale T
z∆(t) = −Bz(t) + Ah(z(t)), (6)
where h(z) = g(z + u∗) − g(u∗). If conditions S1 − S3 are valid for system
(5), it is easy to see that
Σ1. The vector-function f(z) = −Bz + Ah(z) is regressive.
Σ2. |hi(z)| 6 2Mi, i = 1, n for all z ∈ R.
Σ3. |hi(z′)− hi(z′′)| 6 λi |z′ − z′′| , i = 1, n for all z′, z′′ ∈ R.
Conditions Σ1–Σ3 guarantee existence and uniqueness for solution of (6) on
t ∈ [t0,+∞) for any initial values z(t0) = z0.
Theorem 6 (Size-dependent condition). Under the conditions of theorem
5 assume that supT = +∞ and µ(t) 6 µ∗ for all t ∈ T. If inequality
√
n (b+ c) max
16i6n
ki
Ci
6
−1− µ∗b¯+
√
1 + 2µ∗
(
b¯+ b
)
µ∗L
(7)
holds, then unique equilibrium state u = u∗ of system (5) is uniformly
asymptotically stable.
Proof. Clearly, stability of the trivial solution z = 0 of (6) is equivalent to
stability of the stable state u∗ of (5). Let us choose the V (z) = zT z as a
Lyapunov function. It can easily be checked that V (z) is positive definite. If
z(t) is ∆-differentiable at the moment t ∈ Tκ, the full ∆-derivative of V (z(t))
along solution of (6) be as follows
V ∆(z(t)) =
(
zT (t)z(t)
)∆
= zT (t)z∆(t) +
[
zT (t)
]∆
z(σ(t)) =
= zT (t)z∆(t) +
[
zT (t)
]∆ [
z(t) + µ(t)z∆(t)
]
=
= 2zT (t) [−Bz(t) + Ah(z(t))] + µ(t) ‖−Bz(t) + Ah(z(t))‖2
2
.
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Since B is diagonal matrix with all positive diagonal elements, it follows
that maximal eigenvalue of B is b¯ = max
i
{bi} and the same one of −B is
b = min
i
{bi}. Using properties of matrix and vector norms and the fact that
‖h(z(t))‖ 6 L‖z(t)‖ it’s easy to obtain following estimation:
V ∆(z(t)) 6 −2b‖z(t)‖2 + 2‖z(t)‖ ‖A‖
2
‖h(z(t))‖ + µ(t) (b¯‖z(t)‖ + ‖A‖
2
‖h(z(t))‖)2
6 −2b‖z(t)‖2 + 2L ‖A‖
2
‖z(t)‖2 + µ(t) (b¯‖z(t)‖+ L ‖A‖
2
‖z(t)‖)2
6 −
(
2b− 2L ‖A‖
2
− µ(t) (b¯+ L ‖A‖
2
)2) ‖z(t)‖2 .
It is obvious that ψ (‖z‖) = ‖z‖2 belongs to class K. Let us prove that the
function
ξ(t) = 2b− 2L ‖A‖
2
− µ(t) (b¯+ L ‖A‖
2
)2
under theorems’ assumptions belongs to Crd ([t0,∞) ; [0,∞)) and fulfills con-
dition (2).
Indeed, we have ξ(t) > 2b− 2L ‖A‖
2
− µ∗ (b¯+ L ‖A‖
2
)2
. Hence,
lim
t→∞
t∫
t0
ξ(s)∆s = lim
t→∞
t∫
t0
(
2b− 2L ‖A‖
2
− µ(t) (b¯+ L ‖A‖
2
)2)
∆s >
>
(
2b− 2L ‖A‖
2
− µ∗ (b¯+ L ‖A‖
2
)2)
lim
t→∞
t∫
t0
∆s =∞.
Solving quadratic inequality
2b− 2L ‖A‖
2
− µ∗ (b¯+ L ‖A‖
2
)2
> 0
with respect to ‖A‖
2
, we get
−1 − µ∗b¯−
√
1 + 2µ∗
(
b¯+ b
)
µ∗L
6 ‖A‖
2
6
−1− µ∗b¯+
√
1 + 2µ∗
(
b¯+ b
)
µ∗L
.
(8)
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Clearly, by definition of matrix norm left inequality always holds. We have
‖A‖
2
6
√
n ‖A‖∞ =
√
n max
16i6n
n∑
j=1
|aij | =
=
√
n max
16i6n
{
bdi1
Ci
+ · · ·+ bdi,j−1
Ci
+
kic
Ci
+
bdi,j+1
Ci
+ · · ·+ bdin
Ci
}
=
=
√
n max
16i6n
{
kic
Ci
+
b
Ci
∑
j 6=i
dij
}
=
=
√
n max
16i6n
{
kic
Ci
+
kib
Ci
}
=
=
√
n (b+ c) max
16i6n
ki
Ci
.
Now it is easy to see that inequality (7) guarantees non-negativity of ξ(t)
and condition (2). To conclude the proof, it remains to use theorem 2. 
Remark 4. We stress that the left side of inequality (7) gathers main
parameters of network structure (size and maximum relative nodes’ degree).
On the other hand, the right side combines main characteristics of time scale,
nodes’ inertia and resistance, rate of input-output response.
Obviously, for any given matrix A inequality (8) can be checked directly.
Corollary 1. Under the conditions of theorem 5 assume that supT = +∞
and µ(t) 6 µ∗ for all t ∈ T. If inequality
2b− 2L ‖A‖
2
− µ(t) (b¯+ L ‖A‖
2
)2
> 0 (9)
holds, then unique equilibrium state u = u∗ of system (5) is uniformly
asymptotically stable.
Theorem 7 (Size-independent condition). Under the conditions of the-
orem 5 assume that supT = +∞ and µ(t) 6 µ∗ for all t ∈ T. Let C∗ denote
the minimal “capacitance” in the network and K∗ denote the largest node’s
degree:
C∗ = min
16i6n
Ci , K
∗ = max
16j6n
kj.
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If inequality
(b+ c)
K∗
C∗
6
−1− µ∗b¯+
√
1 + 2µ∗
(
b¯+ b
)
µ∗L
(10)
holds, then unique equilibrium state u = u∗ of system (5) is uniformly
asymptotically stable.
Proof. By repeating the same steps as in previous theorem, we obtain
‖A‖
2
6
−1− µ∗b¯+
√
1 + 2µ∗
(
b¯+ b
)
µ∗L
.
Now if we recall matrix norm inequality ‖A‖2
2
6 ‖A‖
1
· ‖A‖∞, we get
‖A‖2
2
6 ‖A‖
1
· ‖A‖∞ =
= max
16j6n
n∑
i=1
|aij | · (b+ c) max
16i6n
ki
Ci
6
= max
16j6n
{
bd1j
C1
+ · · ·+ bdj−1,j
Cj−1
+
kjc
Cj
+
bdj+1,j
Cj+1
+ · · ·+ bdnj
Cn
}
· (b+ c) max
16i6n
ki
Ci
6
= max
16i6n
{
kjc
Cj
+
b
C∗
∑
i 6=j
dij
}
· (b+ c) K
∗
C∗
6
= max
16i6n
{
kjc
C∗
+
bkj
C∗
}
· (b+ c) K
∗
C∗
6
= (b+ c)
K∗
C∗
· (b+ c) K
∗
C∗
= (b+ c)2
(
K∗
C∗
)2
.
It is obvious that inequality (10) guarantees non-negativity of ξ(t) and con-
dition (2). To conclude the proof, it remains to use theorem 2. 
Remark 5. For large network, i. e. n ≫ 1, size-dependent condition
(7) is unlikely to be fulfilled. In the same time condition (10) can be valid
regardless of network’s size.
Theorem 8 (Rate of convergence). Under the conditions of theorem 5
assume that −b ∈ R+ and b− L ‖A‖
2
> 0, where b = min
i
{bi}. Then
1) solution z = 0 of the following system is exponentially stable:
z∆(t) = −Bz(t), z(t0) = z0, t > t0 ∈ T; (11)
2) unique equilibrium state z = 0 of the system (6) is exponentially stable
on t > t0 ∈ T and the following estimation holds:
‖z(t)‖ 6 ‖z0‖ · e−(b−L‖A‖2)(t, t0). (12)
Proof. Since B = diag (bi) it is easy to obtain fundamental matrix Φ−B(t, t0) =
diag (e−bi(t, t0)).
‖Φ−B(t, t0)‖ =
√
λmax
(
ΦT−BΦ−B
)
=
√
λmax
(
diag
(
e2−bi(t, t0)
))
=
= max
16i6n
|e−bi(t, t0)| = e−b(t, t0).
It proofs 1) (see (DaCunha, 2005, Theorem 2.2)).
The solution of (6) satisfies the variation of constants formula Bohner and Peterson
(2012)
z(t) = Φ−B(t, t0)z0 +
t∫
t0
Φ−B(t, σ(s))Ah(z(s))∆s.
Hence we have
‖z(t)‖ 6 ‖Φ−B(t, t0)z0‖+
t∫
t0
‖Φ−B(t, σ(s)) · Ah(z(s))‖ ∆s 6
6 e−b(t, t0)‖z0‖+
t∫
t0
‖e−b(t, σ(s))‖ · ‖A‖2 ‖h(z(s))‖ ∆s 6
6 e−b(t, t0)‖z0‖+
t∫
t0
e−b(t, s)
1− bµ(s) · ‖A‖2 L‖z(s)‖∆s.
Multiplying both sides of inequality by
1
e−b(t, t0)
> 0 (due to −b ∈ R+) we
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obtain
‖z(t)‖
e−b(t, t0)
6 ‖z0‖+
t∫
t0
L ‖A‖
2
1− bµ(s) ·
e−b(t, s)
e−b(t, t0)
· ‖z(s)‖∆s =
= ‖z0‖+
t∫
t0
L ‖A‖
2
1− bµ(s) ·
‖z(s)‖
e−b(s, t0)
∆s.
Further, by using Grownall’s inequality
‖z(t)‖
e−b(t, t0)
6 ‖z0‖ · e L‖A‖2
1−bµ(s)
(t, t0),
or
‖z(t)‖ 6 ‖z0‖ · e−b⊕ L‖A‖2
1−bµ(s)
(t, t0) = ‖z0‖ · e−(b−L‖A‖2)(t, t0).
By conditions of theorem we have − (b− L ‖A‖
2
) ∈ R+. Therefore, the last
estimate means that the solution z = 0 of (6) is exponentially stable. This
completes the proof of theorem. 
Proving Theorems 6, 7 we obtain two variants of majorization for ‖A‖2.
Both of them can be easily used to find direct conditions of exponentially
stability expressed in the terms of network’s structure and nodes’ internal
properties.
Corollary 2. Under the conditions of theorem 5 assume that −b ∈ R+ and
b
L
> min
{√
n (b+ c) max
16i6n
ki
Ci
, (b+ c)
K∗
C∗
}
.
Then unique equilibrium state z = 0 of the system (6) is exponentially stable
on t > t0 ∈ T and the estimation (12) holds.
Obviously, the exponential convergence of the solution for (6) to zero and
the solution u(t) for (5) to the unique equilibrium u∗ are the same.
4. Discussion.
In this paper we developed conditions for various types of stability in
social networks governed by Imitation of Success principle. There isn’t di-
rect, one-to-one correspondence between considered Hopfield neural network
16
model and original game-based model. Hence all obtained results can be con-
sidered only as the base of understanding of opinion propagation in social
network.
We limited ourselves to the one type of node-to-node game, Prisoner’s
Dilemma. Moreover, arguing we deliberately choose few key elements such
as M-matrix characterization, spectral norm estimation etc. Choosing this
elements we were guided by the aim to obtain simple, fast-checkable and
meaningful conditions.
It is an open problem to study network dynamics based on the another
interesting matrix game types. Perhaps, taking into account network’s topol-
ogy or considering particular type of time scale one can develop more specific,
precise, and useful results.
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